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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT IN ACTION
By
FRED BLANTON"

The overwhelming uncertainty of many aspects of the Federal Tort Claims

Act' as revealed by over two years of litigation is both challenging and intriguing.
Statutory interpretation, avowedly for the purpose of arriving at Congressional
intent, has resulted in decisions on divers points that are contradictory; and the
appellate tribunals are faced with the arduous task of resolving the complex questions involved. It is the purpose of this article to portray what has transpired
judicially since the Act became law on 2 August 1946,2 and to investigate very
briefly a few of the major conflicts. Others have been but mentioned, mainly because of an insufficient number of cases.
Stamt

of Limitationsand Related Problems
The passage of time has largely eliminated the early dilemma occasioned by
the conflict between a state statute of limitation which has been construed as a
substantive part of the right created, and that considered as merely procedural.
The Act provides that the United States is liable under circumstances where a
private person "would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred." Since the Act recognized claims accruing
after 1 January 1945,3 and by its clause of limitation extended the time for commencing a civil action thereon against the United States to one year after its
effective date, or 2 August 1947, the problem to be decided was whether the
state rule or the Act clause controlled.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in State of Marylandto Use of Burkbardt
v. United States,' resolved the question by holding that the Act limitation applied, and not Maryland's one year statute, construed as substantive. The Court
reasoned that the Act contemplates the definition of a particular actionable wrong
by the laws of the state where the act or omission occurred, but that the federal
statute must be followed in regard to the timeliness of a civil action to enforce
the liability so defined, especially in order to give any effect to the provision pro*A.B., Birmingham-Southern College, 1939; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1942; Professor
; Member of the Alabama and Birmingham Bar Asof Law, Dickinson School of Law, 1948sociations.
1. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680; Title
IV, Public Law 601, Aug. 2, 1946, formerly 28 U.S.C.A.§ 921 et req.
2 Cases are included up to 15 February 1949 where opinions were published.
8 This date was omitted in the codification of the Judicial Code, since it was felt that it
was no longer applicable as the codification became law on 1 September 1948, well over a year
after the Act became law.
4 165 F2d 869 (1947), overruling State of Maryland to Use of Burkhardt v. United States,
70 F. Supp. 982 (D.C. Md. 1947), noted in 28 NEB. L. REV. 122 (1948).
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viding for the inclusion of events transpiring after 1 January 1945. 5 Otherwise,
the injured person would have no claim since the state period would have run
prior to the date the Act became law. Although no state has been found which
has less than a one year statute of limitations for claims covered by the Act's provisions, 6 the same conclusion could and should be reached in the event the
question arises by virtue of 'a state's having enacted a substantive limitation
statute for a shorter period.
A consideration as to whether the Act creates a new cause of action or
simply removes a procedural bar to an already existing cause is of assistance in
analyzing cases involving the limitation feature 7 and others which will be noted
later. From the viewpoint of the practicing lawyer, who is interested primarily in the
probability of relief for his client and not in the theory as to why he can or cannot
obtain such relief, there has never been a cause of action against the United States for
claims involving negligence. That in fact or theory he may have had a claim
which he could not enforce because of a procedural impediment offered no comfort to him or his client. Practically, then, this is a new causo of action based on
what the particular state where the act or omission occurred conceives to be an
actionable wrong, and the federal government can enact its own statute of limitation. Thus, limitations of the various states, even though regarded by them as
substantive, do not define any of those standards of care the breach of which
leads to liability; and it is only those standards which bear any relationship to
this new cause of action. However, should the Act be construed as merely removing a procedural bar, then the argument that the law of the state in which the
act or omission occurred controls both as to standards of care and time is more
convincing. The removal of the bar would give a forum for enforcing causes of
action which have existed all the time, and their basis could only be the entire
body of substantive law of the state.
Whichever view is taken, Congress must be considered as having delegated
to the legislatures and the courts of the several states the power to determine
the liability of the United States in tort in those situations covered by the Act.
The standards of care expected and required of its agents, officers, and employees,
and the methods of computing damages are as varied as the jurisdictions. Congressional consent to liability of governmental agencies in specific instances and
the authorization of civil actions by and against them resulted in the state courts
entertaining suits determined by the standards of state law. Now that the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction in this type of case, relieving the state courts
of their work in those cases in the tort field covered by the Act, one wonders if
6 Sweet v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 689 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1948).
6 Several states have shorter periods for some torts specifically excluded by the Act, e.g.,

libel, slander.
7 See Wiltse v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 786 (1947); cf. Durranoe v. United States, 101 F2d
109 (CCA 5th 1939).
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Congress was not aiming at a uniform federal law.8 An amendment to the Act
lends substance to this conjecture for although no civil action is allowed which is
based on laws of a punitive nature, Congress has seen fit, and rightly so, to
allow recovery for compensatory damages in wrongful death cases originating
from a state that regards the action as one for punitive damages.9
In other fields, the courts have refused to apply state law in interpreting the
effect of an act authorized by a federal statute. Thus, where the United States
has leased property for governmental use in a state, it has been stated that the
substantive law to be followed for determining the legal incidents flowing from
the lease is not the law of the state wherein the land is located, but, to the contrary, federal law gleaned from federal cases and in their absence the general
law of landlord and tenant. 10 Justice Jackson, speaking for the Supreme Court

in United States v. Allegheny County,1 1 has said:
"The validity and construction of contracts through which the United
States is exercising its Constitutional functions, their consequences, or
the rights and liabilities of the parties, the titles and liens which they
create or permit, all present questions of Federal law not controlled by
the law of any state.
And Justice Douglas in Clearfield Trust Co., et at. v. United States" has said:
"The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws rules
of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United States
to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by
making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the several states.
The desirability of a uniform rule is plain."
Admittedly these are commercial cases, but certainly uniformity is as much to be
desired in the tort field as in other fields. Cases under the Tucker Act' s and Suits
in Admiralty Act, 1 ' so frequently cited as analogies when interpreting the present legislation, do not afford much assistance. Admiralty is an exclusive federal
jurisdiction, and the Tucker Act concerns claims arising from contract wherein
the decisions referred to previously would allow state law little, if any, effect
in arriving at a conclusion. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 15 intimated as compelling the application of state law, 16 cannot be read to infer that the federal
8 The vast expansion of Federal agencies and corporations subject to suit had in some instances
made it extremely difficult to ascertain what particular agency was the correct one to sue. See e. g.
National Housing Agency, et al. v. Orton, 202 S.W. 2d 243 (1947).
9 Act of August 1, 1947, Public Law 324, 80th Congress. Ch. 446, 1st Sess. proviso to § 410
(2); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674.
10 See Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 148 F2d 872, 874 (CCA 3rd 1945).
11 322 U. S. 174, 183, 64 S.Ct. 908, 913, 88 L Ed. 1209 (1944).
12 318 U.S. 363, 744, 63 S.Ct. 573 (1943).
13 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 791, 1333-1046, 1348,
.350, 1351, 1353-1357, 1359, 1397, 1399, 1402,
1491-1494, 1496, 1501, 1503, 2071, 2072, 2361, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2501, 2506, 2509-2511;

formerly 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq.
14 48 U.S.C.A. § 741 et seg.
1f 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).

Is Cf. Durrmnce v. United States, 101 F2d 109 (CCA 3th 1939).
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government cannot determine standards of liability by a uniform rule. In any event
the conclusion can be reached that Congress has abandoned its legislative function
to the states and created a diversity of result where none is to be desired, although
recognizing the patently just conclusion that the sovereign should be responsive
as contemplated by the Act for damages occasioned by the act or omission of its
employees. There can be no quarrel with the purpose of the Act; one can only
question the method employed in attaining it.
With the one year statute of limitation imposed by the Act applying, the
lawyer is then interested in whether or not his civil action has been commenced
within that period so as to be timely. The answer depends first on when the
cause of action arose, and secondly, when the action was commenced to enforce
the claim. Normally, these situations present no difficulties. However, in Le Maine
v. United States,'7 the Court was confronted with a civil action setting forth facts
which showed that the conduct of the United States complained of began in June
1942, well before the 1 January 1945 date of the Act, but that the conduct continued past the latter date. Without deciding exactly what the legal effect of the
conduct was, a continuing nuisance or a continuing trespass, the Court held that
the complaint was not subject to dismissal, although the plaintiff could not recover
for damages accruing prior to 1 January 1945.
A more difficult problem involves the determination of when a civil action
is commenced so as to be within the one year period. While the Tucker Act
prescribes a definite method of filing and service before the action is deemed to
have been commenced, 8 the courts do not have the advantage of such a provision
in the present act. Turkett v. United States' 9 turns on the question of payment
of fees as a prerequisite to filing in the District Court. Where the complaint had
been received in the clerk's office prior to the prescribed limit, and the plaintiff's
attorney had failed to send a check for the filing fees and costs until after the
clerk had written, and where the clerk did not receive these filing fees and costs
until after the time limit, then it was held that the action was not timely. While
many of our states permit the filing of complaints without payment of fees, the
Federal District Courts, by rule of court, have insisted that a plaintiff either pay,
or file a pauper's oath, thereby avoiding the huge backlog of uncollected court
costs so prevalent in some states. One is not inclined to look with much favor
upon a lawyer who is so unfamiliar with his rules of court as to overlook or disregard the payment of these costs, and thereby deny to his client his day in court.
Claimant's alternative of a suit against his attorney is not a satisfactory solution,
but the relaxation of the rules would result in the very chaotic state they are
designed to remedy.
17 76 F. Supp. 498 (D.C. Mass. 1948). Similarly, even though the statute of limitation is
extended by the Act when minors are involved, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401, it does not have the effect
of causing a claim to accrue after 1 January 1945 when the event occurred previous to that date.

Perry v. United States, 170 F2d 844 (CCA 6th 1948).

18 See Note, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1087.
19

76 F. Supp. 769 (D.C.N.D.N.Y. 1948).
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Relating back of an amendment to the original date of filing was before
the Court in Bay State Crabmeat Co v. United States, et al.20 There, counsel stated
a cause of action that was styled by him as a "libel in personam", which the government's attorney attacked as not presenting a maritime cause of action. After
the statute of limitations had run, counsel moved the Court for permission to
amend, and in so doing stated that the amendment was to date back to the original
filing. The Court permitted this, and the cause was removed from the admiralty
to the civil docket. The essential facts upon which the civil action was based
were not changed; indeed, counsel for plaintiff had merely been mistaken in his
legal terminology, and the amendment did not change the legal effect of what
he had previously pleaded. Obviously, the Court would be justified in denying
a relation back when the cause of action itself was changed by the amendment,
for then plaintiff's claim could not be considered to have been commenced within
the statutory time.
Parties in the Action-Subrogees
The Tort Claims Act is so indefinite as to what persons may sue or what
persons have a "claim" under its provisions that the courts have been occupied to
a very large degree with determining what class or classes of people are included. Where an insurance company has paid all or part of the claim which has been
made against it by someone who *has been injured, or whose property has been
damaged as a result of an act or omission of an employee of the United States,
is the insurance company the "real party in interest" or a "proper party"? Does
a subrogee in this event have a "claim" which can be enforced against the United
States? Those courts which deny that the insurance company may enforce a claim
stand on a strict interpretation of the statute, and the Federal Anti-Assignment
Act. 2 ' Four Circuit Courts of Appeals, the Sixth, Ninth, Second, and Fifth, have
ruled that subrogees may sue.22 Old Colony Insurance Co. v. United States23 is
typical of the liberal viewpoint, and held that where the insurance company had
paid the amount of the damage it could sue, the court feeling that "claimant" in
the Act does not mean merely one who has sustained damage to his property,
and further that the Anti-Assignment Act did not apply because the subrogation
20 78 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Mass. 1948) (Admiralty).
21 31 U.S.C.A. § 203 ctseq.; Rusconi, etal. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 669 (D.C.S.D. Cal.
167 F2d 655 (CCA 9th
1947), overruled by Employers' Fire Insurance Co. v. United States, eta!.,
relying on McCarey v.
1948) ; Bewick v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 730 (D.C.N.D. Texas 19-17)
United States (D.C.E.D. Mich.) (not published); Cascade County, Montana, et al. v. United
States, 75 F. Supp. 850 (D.C. Mont. 1948). See Suits on Tort Claims against the United States,
7 F.R.D. 689 (1948). Compare Augusta Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 170 F2d 199 (CCA
5th 1948).
22 Old Colony Insurance Co. v. United States, 169 F2d 931 (CCA 6th 1948), overruling 74
F. Supp. 723 (D.C.S.D. Ohio 1947) ; Employers' Fire Insurance Co. et al. v. United States, et al.
167 F2d 655 (CCA 9th 1948), overruling 74 F. Supp. 669 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1947) ; Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co. v. United States, 170 F2d 469 (CCA 2nd 1948), overruling 76 F. Supp. 333 (D.C.
E.D.N.Y. 1948); South Carolina State Highway Department, 16 CCH Neg. Cases 513 (CCA 5th
1948).
23 169 F2d 931 (CCA 6th 1948).
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was by operation of law. 2 ' Even when there is a contract provision relating io
the assignment of such claims to the insurance company on payment of the loss,
there should be no distinction, since such a provision merely expresses the right
of subrogation which would arise in any event by operation of law. 26 In the
event of a partial subrogation, some courts would say the insured may sue on the
entire claim as the real party in interest,26 or in his name for the use of the insurance company.2 7 A greater number allow the equitable subrogee to sue in his
own name no matter whether totally or partially subrogated.28 One insurance
company assigned the claim back to the insured,2 9 another denominated payment
for the loss a loan,3 0 and civil actions by the insured have withstood government motions to dismiss as not being by the "real party in interest". A statute that is obviously designed to give relief is properly construed to include those who have legitimate
claims. The subrogee's right stems from the same set of facts, and when he is
a party the Federal Government is by no stretch of the imagination subject to any
additional liability. Common law subrogation, which is only pro tanto, is not the
evil of voluntary assignment aimed at in the Anti-Assignment Act.
The main difficulty, granting the soundness of our Circuit Court opinions,
that the subrogee has a claim under the Federal Act which he may institute a
civil action on, is that the District Courts are looking to the state law to see
whether or not he can do so, i. e., the state may say that the suit must be brought
in the name of the one who actually suffers the injury for the use of the insurer,
or that he holds as trustee for the insurer. The simple solution is to consider
this a procedural matter exclusively, and allow the insurance company alone to
sue where it has paid the entire amount of the damage, and for both to join
where there has been a partial payment."' This recognizes that the state law is
the basis for the standards of liability; but leaves in the Federal court the manner
of enforcing that liability by ascertaining the proper parties who have a "claim".
Partiesin the Action-Personsin the Armed Forces
The relation of the person in the Armed Forces to the United States has
See Note, 28 NEB. L. REV. 111 (1948).
Hill et al. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 129 (D.C.N.D. Texas 1947).
Van Wie v, United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (D.C. Iowa 1948).
Grace, et al. to Use of Granger Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 174
(D.C. Md. 1948). Compare Augusta Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 170 F2d 199 (CCA 5th 1948).
28 Old Colony Insurance Co. v. United States, supra; Employers' Fire Insurance Co. et al. v.
United States, supra; Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States, supra; Wojicick et al. v.
United States et al., 74 F. Supp. 914 (D.C.E.D. Wis. 1947) ($50 deductible policy) ; Niagara
Fire Insurance Co. v. United States; Comm'r of State Insurance Fund v. United States (Two Cases),
76 F. Supp. 850 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1948); Insurance Company of North America v. United States,
76 F. Supp. 951 (D.C.E.D. Va. 1948) ; Gray, et al. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 869 (D.C. Mass.
1948); Town of Amherst et al. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 80 (D.CW.D.N.Y. 1948); South
Carolina State Highway Department, et al. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 594 and 78 F. Supp. 598
(1948), aff'd 16 CCH Neg. Cases 513 (CCA 4th 1948) ; State Road Department of State of Florida
v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 278 (D.C.N.D. Fla. 1948).
29 Forrester v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 272 (D.C.E.D. Wis. 1947).
20 Augusta Broadcasting Co. v, United States, 170 F2d 199 (CCA 5th 1948).
81 See North American Fire Insurance Co. v. United States, 16 CCH Neg. Cases 483 (CCA
24
26
26
27
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been injected as a factor in ascertaining what classes of persons are included or
excluded by the Act. A member of the Armed Forces, eo nomine, is not within
any stated exclusion, nor is his "claim" within those excluded. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals has considered a claim based on a so-called "non-service caused"
injury sustained by a soldier on furlough while riding in a private automobile
which was struck as the result of the negligence of the driver of an Army truck.8s
The majority of the Court, speaking through Dobie, J., denied that the soldier
was contemplated by the Act and hence was excluded, or did not have a claim,
basing the decision in the main on the fact that Congress had previously passed
benefits by way of pensions, etc., for the serviceman who was so injured. Some
of Judge Dobie's argument is unconvincing, especially where he attempts to show
that if one soldier were injured in Canada he would have no claim because it
arose in a foreign country, while if another were injured at Plattsburg, just a
few miles south of the Canadian border, he would have a claim, and this unequal
result could not have been intended. However, the identical result is reached if
civilians be injured in like circumstances, and if his argument is followed then
no civilian is covered by the Act. For injuries arising in a foreign country, no
cause of action is given by the Act, which is determinative of nothing connected
with the status of the person injured. One District Court has" reached the conclusion that there is nothing in the Act which excludes "soldiers as a class, and
therefore a soldier may sue, especially where the injury is non-service connected", a3
Judge Parker in a dissent in United States v. Brooks,34 referred to previously,
points up the question of whether or not the soldier's case has a basis in state
law, i. e., does the state set up standards of conduct the breach of which will lead
to liability in these cases involving soldiers? The Act reads that the United
States shall be liable, "if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for
such damage, loss, injury, or death in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." 86 With nothing more, if the Federal Government
were a private person it would be liable; the standards of conduct have been
breached. There is a "claim" enforceable in a civil action given by the Tort
Claims Act. But does the state where the act or omission occurred make an exception in the event one soldier sues another soldier and conclude that there is
no liability because of the status of the parties involved? In an action in a state
court could the driver of the army vehicle have successfully defended on the
sole ground that both he and the plaintiff were soldiers?
A serviceman is dearly exempt from prosecution by civilian authorities if
he acts within the scope of his authority as a serviceman. Persons in the military
9th 1948) ; Yorkshire Insuxance Co, v. United States, 16 CCH Neg. Cases 412 (CCA 3rd 1948).
82 United States v. Brooks, 169 F2d 840 (CCA 4th 1948).
38 Sansom v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 406 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1947). Plaintiff was an Army
private injured on a bus operated by the War Department. Held, soldier's claim was not excluded.

24 169 F2d 840 (CCA 4th 1948).
53 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346.
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are not, by reason of their military character, relieved of their duties and liabilities or deprived of their rights as citizens.3 6 No cases have been found specifically
involving the negligence point. However, to sue another person in the service
for damages arising out of a trespass it must be shown that the defendant acted
outside the scope of his office or abused his discretion.37 Our law has provided
for remand from the state courts to the federal courts of actions commenced
against a person in the Armed Forces where the suit is based on an event which
was done "under color of his office or status." 88 It would seem then that the
denial of liability is not based on the sole consideration that one serviceman is
suing another; but instead on whether or not what he was doing was within the
hne and scope of his office as to the plaintiff serviceman. If he was acting within such line and scope, then the defendant serviceman would not be personally
liable; if he was not acting within such line and scope, then he would be personally liable. If the former, and the action is based on negligence, then it should
be within the terms of the Act. If the latter, then it would not be "caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission... while acting within the scope of his
office or employment". 3 9 The Tort Claims Act says:
"The judgment in such an action shall constitute a complete bar to
any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against
the employee
of the Government whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim." 40
This section, when applied to the serviceman situation as developed here, is merely a restatement of what the law already is; for there would be no right of action
in the first place against the defendant serviceman who has acted within the line
and scope of his office as regards the injured serviceman.
Our pension laws state that to be eligible for a pension a serviceman must
4
be "injured while in the service of the United States and in the line of duty". "
A person while on authorized furlough is "in the line of duty". However, the
man who goes A. W. 0. L. does not have such a status and if injured would not
be entitled to a pension. If such a person is injured under the circumstances of
the Brooks case, could it be said with any degree of conviction that "status" alone
would be sufficient to deny him or his representatives a recovery? His absence
from his station is not the cause of his injury, but there would exist the anomalous
situation that he could not recover against the driver because the negligence has
occurred in the line of the driver's office or employment, nor could he recover
88 6 Corpus Juris Secundum § 36, p. 419.
87 Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. 89, U. S. (1849). Cf. Wilson v. Mackenzie, 7 Hill (N.Y.)
95 (assault); Clark v. Cumins, 47 II1. 372 (property).
88 10 U.S.C.A. § 1059. See Pendleton v. Bussey et al,, 30 F. Supp. 211 (D.C.W.D. Va. 1939)
where it was held in a case of slander that the District Court did not have original jurisdiction.
However, the basis of the suit in Virginia was pointed out and it was intimated that two service
people could sue each other in these circumstances.
89 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346. Cf. Cropper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 81 (D.C.N.D. Fla. 1948).
40 Ibid.
41 See 38 U.S.C.A. § 152 for an example of the many such provisions.
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against the government because he was a soldier and was injured by a soldier.
This suggests that the test as to a cause of action should be based on the service
relation between the parties involved, i. e., the determination should be made as
to whether the negligent serviceman was in the position of a serviceman to the
plaintiff at the time the event happened. If he were in such a position, then
the state would not interfere with something strictly a service matter and under
the absolute control of the Federal Government. If he were not in such a position, then the state law as to negligence would not be intruding on a strictly
federal function. Jefferson v. United States,42 involving a serviceman allegedly
injured by a service doctor, would be a clear case wherein state law would not
be a basis for liability for there the relationship was service doctor to service
patient. Alansky, et al, v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. et al,48 which involved a soldier
under orders flying on an aircraft operated by Northwest Airlines, Inc., but owned and under the control of the War Department, could be placed on similar
grounds. The Court there dismissed the action of his representatives purely on
the "status" theory. This distinction between "service caused" and "non-service
caused" injuries certainly appears to be justified, and merely recognizes that although a person is in the Armed Forces he is not to be denied a right when he
is not specifically excluded from its enjoyment."4
Partiesin the Action-Respondeat Superior
In Perucki v. United States," the state law of Pennsylvania concerning respondeat superior was urged in a motion to dismiss a civil action based on the
alleged negligence of a Veteran's Administration doctor in examining the plaintiff.
Pennsylvania decisions have consistently held that charitable institutions are not
liable in the case of injuries occasioned by the negligence of their agents or servants.
The Court here correctly examined the rationale of the rule, 46 and stated that
the reason for the immunity was destroyed, especially as regards the United States.
There may be the further consideration that the Pennsylvania rule should not
apply because "a private person" within the meaning of the Act would not include "a charitable institution," and a private person would be responsive in damages if the doctor-agent were acting within the line and scope of his employment.
The wisdom of this District Court in reaching the instant decision on this
point is manifest. To have limited liability in the manner contended for by the
United States would have left the individual veteran at the complete mercy of
the law of the state where he happened to receive treatment. A rigid application
74 F. Supp. 209 (D.C. Md. 1947) and 77 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Md. 1948).
48 77 F. Supp. 556 (D.C. Mont. 1948).
44 In Stoddard v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 823 (D.C. Mass. 1948), plaintiff had just been
42

discharged at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and was injured on a government bus which collided
with an Army ambulance. "Status" alone could create many difficulties here because of the technical

position of a dischargee to the service until he has returned to his home. Plaintiff obtained a
verdict for $6065.00.
45 76 F. Supp. 34 (D.C.M.D. Pa. 1948) and 80 F. Supp. 959 (D.C.M.D. Pa. 1948).
46 See PROSSER on TORTS, p. 1079 etreq.
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of the state law in such situations will destroy the equal treatment which is
so necessary in the relationship that exists between the Federal Govelnment and
veterans.
Parties in the Action-Joinder of the United States and Another
Actions under the Act are tried by a judge sitting without a jury, although
one court, apparently not too familiar with the law, stated that the parties had
waived a jury trial, 47 and another made it known that a jury would have been
most welcome in a particularly difficult case.48 Since individual defendants are
entitled constitutionally to a jury trial, the propriety of a suit against joint
tortfeasors--the United States and an individual-has raised a problem. One
District Court has approached the matter quite realistically and allowed joinder,
because, although not specifically mentioned by the Act, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure look to this method, and no greater obligation is placed thereby
on the United States. 4 9 But the Court must have jurisdiction over the civil action
against the individual defendant, or the court will dismiss it on its own motion. 50
It would seem then that if an individual defendant is sued in the Federal court
that the United States may be impleaded in the action, 51 though there is considerable authority to the contrary.52 When the state law provides for contribution
against joint tortfeasors, one District Court has not allowed joinder of defendants on the ground that contribution is not a part of the orginal tort and that
to allow joinder would subject the United States to a liability to which it has not
consented. 59 The lines of approach have been clearly delineated. Some courts
will deny joinder and, a fortiori, impleader, even though the state law does not
permit contribution, on the theory that a strict construction of the Act demands
it, and that there is no jurisdiction over such a cause. Others, where the state
law so provides, consider contribution another or derivative cause of action to
which the United States has not consented, hence no joinder.
Exclusions-General
By the terms of the Act, corporations established by the Federal Government
are no longer entities to be sued in those causes therein covered. One district
court has had to dismiss a civil action naming the Inland Waterways Corporation as a defendant. 64 The Act covers only civil actions for negligence and could
47 See Spell v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 731 (D.C. Fla. 1947).
48 See Wilscam v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 581, 586 (D.C. Hawaii 1948).
49 Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D.C. Md. 1947). Contra: Donovan et al. v.
McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 691 (D.C. Mass. 1948); see Suits on Tort Claims against the United
States, 7 F.R.D. 689 (1948).
50 Bullock et al. v. United States, et al., 72 F. Supp. 445 (D.C.N.J. 1947).
51 Cf. Newsum v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 79 F. Supp. 225 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1948).
52 Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp., (D.C. Mass. 1948); Urate v. United States, 7. FR.D.
705; see 7. F.R.D. 689 (1948).
53 Drummond v. United States, et al., 78 F. Supp. 730 (D.C.E.D. Va. 1948). Cf. Oahu Railway and Land Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 707 (D.C. Hawaii 1947). Compare Newsum v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., supra.
6Wickman v. lalnd Wbarways Corp., 78 F. Sipp. 284 (D.C. Mihns. 1948):

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

not be interpreted as covering assault and battery or an invasion of rights protected
by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution;"6 claims for

overtime and bonus pay as an employee of the Army Transport Service; 5 illegal

imprisonment; 67 or false arrest.68 An ingenious argument as to jurisdiction was

advanced in Bates v. United States,59 predicated on the theory that since the amount
in this particular case was only $2,000.00 the court would not have jurisdiction

over a "private person", and the United States was liable only "if a private person
would be liable to claimant". The court correctly stated that this provision has

reference to the creation or existence of a substantive right or claim, and that
jurisdiction is conferred by the Act itself. Where there is an individual defend-

ant joined, of course, the jurisdictional requirements as to him would have. to
be met. 60

Exclusions-CombatantActivities
Damages arising from the "combatant activities" of the Armed Forces are
excluded by the Act's provisions, and one court has ruled that "training" activities, even though conducted during a period of war, did not fall within this
exception. 61 The injury complained of occurred six miles off the shore of Texas
in the Gulf of Mexico, which is outside the territorial waters of the United States.
No question was raised as to whether or not the high seas would be included
within the exception relating to acts occurring in foreign countries. Under the
court's theory that the negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury
was the failure to establish bombing zones or to warn craft in the area used,
which omission occurred in the United States, there was no necessity for such a
consideration. However, with long-range bombers spanning the oceans with ease,
the United States plane involved might well have taken off from a foreign country,
with the same injury resulting, or, similarly, if plaintiff in the instant case had
had to rely on a theory of negligence which could not be so easily attributed to an
event in the United States, the court would have been called upon to decide this
problem. The ingenuity of counsel for plaintiff will be put to the test of devising
a negligence formula which will put the act or omission in the United States.
In Perucki v. United States, supra, the plaintiff involved had been wounded
in action, and the alleged negligence occurred during an examination after his
discharge. The court fell into the trap of a "but for" argument and stated that
but for the fact that plaintiff had been injured in combatant activities he would
have had no injury here, and reached the conclusion that the claim which was
the subject of the civil action was one arising from combatant activities and hence
66 Bell et a]., v. Hood et al., 71 F. Supp. 813 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1947).
56 Jentry v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 899 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1947).

67 Ecberg v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 99 (Ct. Claims 1948) (Nor is there original jurisdic.
tion in the Court of Claims under the Act).
58 Denahey v. Isbrandsten Co., 80 F. Supp. 180 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1948).
59
60

76 F. Supp. 57 (D.C. Neb. 1948).

Bullock et al. v. United States et al., 72 F. Supp. 445 (D.C.N.J. 1947).
61 Skels v. Uaitcd 5%ta, 72 F, $Supp. 372 (D.C.W.D. La. 1947).
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excluded. This claim in fact did not arise from combatant activities, but from
the alleged negligence of a doctor acting within the scope of his office. That a
reason that plaintiff submitted to the examination was a combat wound would
not justify the conclusion that an injury resulting from the examination is a claim
which is excluded. The combat wound is not the proximate cause of what plaintiff
here complains;6 2 the proximate cause is the alleged negligence of the doctor.
This result seems to be an unwarranted limitation of governmental liability, and
if followed would result in immunity in every case of negligence during an examination by a government doctor of a combat inflicted condition after the discharge of the person in the Armed Forces. That he may have another remedy
does not add support to the contention that he does not have this remedy. The
problem may become one of election of remedies as mentioned later.
Exclusions-ForeignCountries
Claims are excluded which arise in a foreign country and exactly what is
a foreign country, in fact, has received considerable attention in the courts because citizens have been visiting the global outposts of the Armed Forces. Okinawa, 68 Japan,64 Belgium," 5 Newfoundland, 66 and Saipan 6 7 have been held to be
foreign countries. In Newfoundland, the injury complained of occurred on property held under the terms of a 99 year lease, and the case is somewhat clouded
by a decision which extended the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act to a
similar base in Bermuda as constituting a posesssion of the United States.6 8 In
the case of foreign enemy territory conquered and held by our Armed Forces,
emphasis is placed on the international law aspect, and the United States has
not asserted jurisdiction over these places. Indeed, as to the Pacific territory the
United States has specifically denied that it has any intention of doing so. In
the case of liberated friendly territory, e. g. Belgium, the United States never acquired jurisdiction and it remained a foreign country. Considering the fact that
venue for the civil action may be in the district court where the tort occurred,
then Congress must have intended to limit the jurisdiction to those causes which
occur within the territorial limits of a district court. This gives a satisfactory
basis to a denial of the cause of action from injuries arising on territory held
by long-term lease where the nominal sovereign has ceded jurisdiction to the
United States.6 9
"lWithin the Scope of His Office or Employment"
Several cases have turned on whether or not the act or omission of the
62 Compare Johnson v. United States, 16 CCH Neg. Cases 409 (CCA 9th 1948).

6S Brewer v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 405 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1948).
64 Denahey v. Isbrandsten Co., 80 F. Supp. 180 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1948).
65

Straneri v, United States, 75 F. Supp. 240 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1948).

66 Spelar v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1948), overruled by 16 CH Neg.
Cases 472 (CCA 2nd 1948).
67 Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1948).
68 Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co. Inc., 164 F2d 924.
69 Contra: Spelar v, United States, 16 CCH Neg. Cases 472 (CCA 2d 1948).
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employee of the government was "within the scope of his office or employment".1 0 Some courts have dismissed complaints on government affidavits under
the federal rules; others have put the parties to their proof. The R. 0. T. C.
instructor is partly under federal and partly under state control, and the court
has rejected affidavits to show that he was not under ffederal control; 1 but
summary judgment for the United States, on the pleadings and affidavit of a
naval petty officer stationed as a recruiter that he was driving his own car after
duty hours, has been granted.72 A sailor traveling under orders cross-country
by train who leaves the train at a stop for refreshments and while rushing back
to the train injures a person was found to be acting within the scope of his employment.78 And it is clear that California's "permissive use" statute which makes
the owner of a car liable for the negligence of the user will not apply to the
government, where the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment.7 4 Nor is an employee of the Public Health Service, although paid from
when
United States budgeted funds, acting within the scope of such employment
75
he is performing duties under the local supervisor of a local project.
Other Aspects
Several problems have not reached major proportion before the courts thus
far, and it will suffice to briefly summarize them by a reference to the cases.
A settlement for medical bills and property damage prior to the passage of the
Act has been held not to be a bar to a subsequent recovery for pain and suffering 6 but the Fifth Circuit has ruled otherwise in the same situation.77 A New
Jersey District Court has held that the acceptance of benefits under the Federal
Employee's Compensation Act is not a bar to subsequent recovery under the Tort
Claim Act, where the acceptance was prior to the passage of the Act. 78 However,
such acceptance would be a bar where in fact there is an election, i. e. the benefits
were taken after the passage of the Act. 7 9
70 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346.
71 Cobb v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 713 (D.C.W.D. La. 1947) (R.O.T.C. instructor); and
81 F. Supp. 9 (D.C.W.D. La. 1948) (proof showed not a Uniied States employee).
12

Rutherford v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 867 (D.C.E.D. Tenn. 1947).

78 Campbell v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 181 (D.C.F.D. La. 1948).

74 Long v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 35 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1948); Cropper v. United States, 81
F. Supp. 81 (D.C.N.D. fla. 1948).
7 Fries v. United States. 76 F. Stipp. 386 (D.C.W.D. Ky. 1948), aff'd 170 F2d 726 (1948).
16 Wade et al. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 729 (D.C. Mass. 1948).
77 Jordan v. United States, 170 F2d 211 (CCA 5th 1948).

78 White v. United States; Crowley v. Same, 77 F. Supp. 316 (D.C.N.J. 1948). Compare
Jefferson v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 209 (D.C. Md. 1947).
79 Parr v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 693 (D.C. Kans. 1948). Compare Perucki v. United
States, 80 F. Supp. 959 (D.C.M.D. Pa. 1948); Wham v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 126 (D.C.
Dist. Col. 1948).
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State law as to a showing of negligence as a matter of law,"' and contributory
negligence and its effect has been applied rather consistently, and also the local
negligence and its effect 8 l has been applied rather consistently, and also the local
rule as to the computation of damages.88 Each of these may result in situations
where the same set of facts occurring in different states would produce different
results as to the liability of the United States, and, if liable, as to the actual
amount of damages which may be recovered.
Conclasion
This article will have served its purpose if the reader has been as impressed
as the writer with the enormous task placed in the federal courts Ly the Tort
Claims Act. The tremendous size of the federal establishment and its variety
of activities will assure a steady flow of civil actions based on its provisions. In
the past, claimants have undoubtedly been deterred by the very slowness of Congress in acting on the private bills which were necessary for relief in cases of

this kind. The Congress has, it seems, quite correctly made this a matter for judicial
determination.

The lack of uniformity in the results obtained under the Act is to be regretted.
That a citizen of the United States should be treated differently merely because
he happens to be injured in one state and not another is not expressive of that
equal treatment to be expected when one deals with the Federal Government. That
a citizen's relation is made to depend on the state law is unfortunate when Congress could have provided for that uniformity which is desirable in other spheres
of federal activity.
EOJohnson v. United States, 168 F2d 886 (CCA 2nd 1948) ; Madden v. United States, 76 F.
Supp. 41 (D.C.N.D. Fla. 1948), Compare Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 78 F. Supp.
673 (D.C.E.D.N.Y. 1948) (Maritime tort); Duff, etc. v. United States, 16 CCH Neg. Cases 507
,(CCA 4th 1949); Denny et ux v. United States, 16 CCH Neg. Cases 448 (CCA 5th 1948).
91 Norton v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 278 (D.C.S.D. Texas 1947) ; Madden v. United States,
supra; Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (D.C.N.D. Iowa 1948) ; Reyes v. United States,
80 F. Supp. 555 (Puerto Rico 1948) ; Cobb v. United States, 81 F. Surp. 9 (D.C.W.D. La. 1948).
82 Sec. e. g, Spell v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 731 (D.C.S.D. Fla. 1947); Norton v. United
States, supra; McMullen v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 164 (D.C.E.D.N.Y. 1947); Campbell v.
United States, 75 F. Supp. 181 (D.C.E.D. La.); Parmiter v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 823 (D.
C. Mass, 1948); Stoddard v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 823 (D.C. Mass. 1948); Wilscam v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 581 (D.C. Hawaii 1948); Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22
(D.C.N.D. Iowa 1948) ; Bickley v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 454 (D.C.D.S.C. 1948) ; Colerick v.
United States, 77 F. Supp. 953 (D.C.N.D. Fla. 1948) ; Corkan -.. United States, 79 F. Supp. 222
(D.C.S.D.W. Va. 1948); Potto v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 833 (D.C.W.D. Ky. 1948); Croun
et a. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 840 (D.C.M.D. Pa. 1948) ; Barnett v. United States, 78 F. Supp.
186 (D.C.N.D. Fla. 1948).

